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ABSTRACT
For Love or Money: Has Neoliberalism Impacted Fertility?
A Historical Comparison
by
Elizabeth A. Kiester, Master of Science
Utah State University 2010
Major Professor: Dr. Christy Glass
Department: Sociology
Known as neoliberalism, an economic philosophy has spread throughout the
world and may be contributing to total fertility rates that have fallen well below
replacement value. I present two neoliberal mechanisms and how they may have driven
total fertility rates around the world well below replacement levels and inhibited growth.
These include increased social risks in the labor market as well as in the household. I
then build a theoretical framework based on the social embeddedness of markets as
conceived by Karl Polanyi and the concept of social risk as suggested by Richard Breen,
suggesting that the unique combinations of speed and degree of adaptation can be broken
into four ideal types. For each combination I indicate a unique hypothesis that indicates
expected fertility patterns to emerge. Using the above mechanisms and framework, I use
four historical case studies (Sweden, Germany, France and the UK) to represent each of
the ideal models and test the validity of my theoretical framework and assertions. Finally,
I draw conclusions regarding the impact of neoliberalism on fertility from these case
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studies and present future implications of these findings as well as proposed future
research.
(70 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years, rather unexpected discussions over declining population
due to stagnating, below replacement fertility levels in conjunction with rising life
expectancies have been brought to the table. A few examples of these discussions include
the conception of "lowest-low" fertility (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009), the
impact of depopulation on world economies (Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff 2008), the
contribution of modernization on fertility and population sustainability (Riche 2004), and
the "crisis status" of low fertility (Morgan 2003). While the transition from an
agricultural to a manufacturing society brought about a predictable decline in fertility (as
children were no longer considered labor assets) the invention, widespread use, and social
acceptability of birth control also gave women a choice in family planning and reduced
the number of unwanted births (Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Lesthaeghe 2010). Yet,
few would argue that birth control itself directly reduces fertility levels, but rather, gives
women a means for controlling the number of children which she feels capable of
providing for-often based on economic circumstances (Axinn and Yabiku 2001).
As women are a key factor in fertility discussions, it is important to understand
how structural mechanisms may affect the way they behave. The role of women has
changed dramatically over the past 30 years. No longer can they be classified as "stay at
home moms" or "business professionals." Instead, women are faced with juggling both
titles. In 1975, 47% of women with children under the age of 18 worked outside the
home. By 2008, that number had risen to 71% (Gibbs, Fitzpatrick, Ford, Van Dyke2009).
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In addition, what was once considered a matter of equal rights and opportunities has
become a necessity for maintaining a middle class lifestyle. "There are now 3.3 million
married couples in which the wife is the sole earner. That is 2.4 million more than in
1970" (Gibbs et al. 2009:29). It is thus unsurprising that the changing role of women in
the labor market would impact the the family unit as well.
While existing fertility transition theories acknowledge the economic aspects
associated with marriage and childbearing (Lesthaeghe 2010), I contend that a shift in
economic philosophy pursued by developed nations starting in the late 1970s and early
1980s has played a significant role in altering age at first marriage, postponed
childbearing, fertility decline, and most notably, below replacement total fertility rates-all
trends found in the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe
and Neidert 2006). Known as neoliberalism, this economic philosophy has since spread
throughout the world and may be a contributing factor in falling total fertility rates
(TFR). Since the implementation of neoliberal policies in 1980, most advanced
industrialized nations' TFR have fallen well below the replacement value of 2.1 while
allowing for only modest fertility recuperation since. This paper asks how the rise of
neoliberal policies in the 1980s may have impacted fertility rates. Specifically, I develop
a theoretical framework that identifies two key mechanisms by which neoliberal reforms
have impacted individual and household risk, thereby influencing fertility decisions. I
then apply this theory to four empirical case studies that compare how the unique
combinations of speed and degree of neoliberal policy adaptation impacts fertility. I
intend to contribute to the current discussions on declining fertility levels by adding
theoretical insight regarding the impact of macro economic policies regarding both the
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labor market and the welfare state on fertility over the past thirty years. This research is
significant in that it addresses the rising concern of negative population growth that
occurs with stagnate below replacement fertility. Policy makers struggle to create
effective policies that can promote the necessary fertility rates to support rapidly aging
populations and weak national economies. This paper offers insight into the policy
formation ideas that would provide both security and mitigate social risks faced by the
individual and the household.
Economic changes instituted in the late 1970s and early 1980s have impacted the
way in which the state interacts with the market as well as how the market impacts
employer-employee relationships and have brought about the retrenchment of the welfare
state. The impact of market influence, specifically on women's fertility decisions, has
also become a subject of interest to sociologists, demographers, and economists alike.
Particular topics pertaining to women's labor market participation and fertility include
maternal benefits (Ellingsaeter 2009), unemployment and insecure labor contracts
(Adsera 2004), female labor market behavior (McNown, Rajbhandary, and Cigno 2003),
the wage penalty on motherhood (Budig and England 2001; Gangl and Ziefle 2009), and
levels of female employment (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Gibbs et al. 2009; Romeu
Gordo 2009).
In order to understand what impact neoliberalism may have had on fertility
decisions over the past 30 years and how the current understanding of the SDT may not
fully account for the impact of this economic philosophy, I first present existing theories
of fertility decline and macro economic structures impacting women's labor market
decisions. Next, I address the impact of neoliberalism on labor policies and the net
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impact on labor security and declining social insurance. By doing so, I identify the
mechanisms that may create downward pressure on fertility patterns. Thirdly, I build a
theoretical framework based on the social embeddedness of markets by Karl Polanyi and
the concept of social risk by Richard Breen. Based on this framework, I hypothesize that
the speed and degree to which each country adapted to these neoliberal economic
philosophies via policy changes will impact their fertility patterns differently. I then
identify four ideal types of countries based on their unique speed and degree of neoliberal
adaptation. Using the two primary mechanisms that impact fertility and four ideal
models in which these mechanisms will operate, I present historical case studies of four
countries,1 each of which has been selected to represent one of the ideal models. Finally, I
draw conclusions regarding the impact of neoliberalism on fertility from these case
studies and present future implications of these findings.

1 Sweden, Germany, France, and The United Kingdom
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Theories of Fertility Decline
In 1986, Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa coined the term Second
Demographic Transition (SDT), suggesting that populations displaying certain
demographic trends would experience a predictable decline in fertility behavior (van de
Kaa 1987). These trends primarily focused on an increase in age at first marriage and the
postponement of childbearing (Lesthaeghe 2010; van de Kaa 1987). They viewed the
start of these trends in the 1950s, encompassing revolutions in contraception, sexuality,
and gender. Each was perceived as a cultural shift. Fertility levels also began to decline
in an apparent correlation with these culturally acceptable demographic changes. Figure
12 demonstrates the noticeable decline in total fertility rates in developed countries
starting in the 1950s.
3.5
3

TFR

2.5
2
1.5

2005-2010

2000-2005

1995-2000

1990-1995

1985-1990

1980-1985
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Figure 1. Total Fertility Rates in Developed Countries, 1950-2010
2

All TFR data is provided by the World Research Institute at earthtrends.wri.org and derived from the
"Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat" in the World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision (2007). I use 5 year intervals to
mitigate year-to-year fluctuations based on local or environmental context. The 2005-2010 period is
based on population estimates. I do not show the TFR range from 0-.99 as there is no activity.
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I contend that while fertility was declining prior to the spread of neoliberalism, it
is specifically neoliberal mechanisms that increase social risk and create a downward
pressure on fertility. Such pressure has resulted in below replacement fertility in many
countries around the world, reaching lowest low levels of 1.3 and below and with modest
if any ability to recuperate.
In a contemporary revisitation of the original theory, Lesthaeghe (2010) examines
both marriage trends and declining fertility levels around the world since the second half
of the twentieth century. In doing so, he discusses his concern that fertility levels had
reached lowest-low total fertility rate levels of 1.3 or below, that such low rates have been
sustainable, and that so many countries would remain at below replacement fertility
levels for such an extended period without signs of recuperation. Additionally he
addresses critiques of the SDT as a European phenomena as he suggests similar trends
can now be seen outside of Western Europe (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Neidert
2006). He notes the continuing trend of increasing age at at marriage and postponement
of childbearing around the world. He reiterates a correlation of fertility decline with
increases in "individual autonomy," "higher-order needs," and the satisfaction of basic
needs met through a welfare state (Lesthaeghe 2010:222). While this correlation appears
sound, I will suggest a sub-narrative that there has been a change in state-marketemployee relationships and welfare state retrenchment that have increased social risks for
individuals and families which create a downward pressure on fertility. This pressure
may impact the childbearing decision.
Lesthaeghe (2010) relates changes in female education and labor force
participation to increased age at first marriage and postponement of childbearing as

7
indicators of these socially acceptable changes in culture. Other researchers critique this
assumption of a cultural shift, and instead highlight ecological and structural demands
that later may create the conditions amenable to a cultural change (Bryant 2007;
Crenshaw, Christenson, and Oakley 2000; Mason 1997). I seek to expand on the
importance of macro level state and economic structures and their influence on individual
social risk in fertility outcomes. By doing so, I hope to expand on the the structural
mechanisms that have created a contemporary need out of trends found in SDT including
postponement of marriage and childbearing due to increased time gaining education and
building labor market and economic security.
John Bongaarts (2002) is also concerned with the sustained lowest-low fertility
levels spreading throughout the world. Like Lesthaeghe, he focuses on the increased age
of first marriage as well as the mean age of childbearing. Bongaarts (2002:427)
examines childbearing intentions with completed fertility and finds that completed
fertility falls short, citing"career preferences, marital disruption, celibacy, and
infecundity" as explanatory factors. He then attributes differences in period and cohort
fertility to the resulting tempo effects on total fertility rates. However, he minimizes
ecological factors that may be contributing to women's delays in marriage and child
bearing. The role of state and market institutions and risk mechanisms should not be
overlooked as they may contribute to Bongaarts' explanatory factors.
The neoclassical Economic Theory of Fertility addresses the link between fertility
and economic circumstances in a classical tradition (Becker and Barro 1988). This
theory describes the altruism of parents towards their future children while weighing the
utility of children along with economic factors including consumption, interest rates,
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capital accumulation, and inheritance. Becker and Barro (1988) suggest that as long as
current economic circumstances are beneficial, having children is a rational decision.
The assumption of rational choice is inherently dangerous in that it dismisses free agency
of individual actors. Additionally, Becker and Barro (1988) act as proponents of free
market economics and fail to see the unintended consequences of their imperfections.
This argument is controversial at best as markets are not always predictable, which I
contend is also due to the absence of thought given to free agency. It would suggest that
those with more money have more to offer and would have more children of which there
is no evidence. Quite the contrary. Those with more money often have fewer children as
to provide a higher quality of life for a few then spreading it out over many. Additionally,
if this theory holds true, fertility rates would fluctuate with economic highs and lows.
Yet historical trends show declining fertility over the past six decades. The theoretical
approach I will suggest addresses these concerns by suggesting that there is a broad array
of macro structural influences on fertility of which individuals and families will have to
address when considering whether or not to have children, when, and how many. Becker
(1992:187) does address the "price of children" and the role of the state in subsidizing (or
in some instances taxing), he does not go far enough in addressing the choices individuals
may have for minimizing that price or the way in which they accept or reject structural
circumstances. While some instances may be considered rational and predictable by
Becker and Barro's theory, others clearly may not.
John C. Caldwell (1997) provides a critique of fertility transition theorists by
suggesting that observable declines were inevitable and could have been predicted.
"Demographic pressure was intertwined with ideas, ideologies, and organized assistance
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(Caldwell 1997:809). In other words, Caldwell is suggesting that declining fertility
trends are man made even if they are considered unintended consequences. In a
subsequent article Caldwell, Caldwell, and McDonald (2002) describe some
contemporary concerns with low fertility. They first suggests that the number of women
who wish to enter the labor market may still be rising which may contribute to the
continuation of declining fertility trends. Second, they reiterate concerns about an aging
population's reliance on taxation of the working population which appears to be
shrinking. This concern also merges with concerns over ability to retire, retirement
taxation, workforce structure and experience. Lastly, they foresee a possible increase in
nationalism due to shrinking population size and power. This last issue would be of great
concern if policy makers were to adopt a pro-migration stance to boost working age
populations and address the above labor market concerns. In summary, Caldwell et al.
(2002) suggest that "social changes are driven by economic [changes]" and also suggest
that they may be interpreted and affect populations differently based on historical and
cultural foundations.
Additional research indicates that macro level processes often influence micro
level decisions. Berik, van der Meulen Rodgers, and Seguino (2009:2) specifically argue
that "macroeconomic theory and policy should be constructed within the broader
framework of human well-being" while Axinn and Yabiku (2001:1219) concur that there
are empirical implications stemming from "social context as a determinant of individual
behavior." Subsequent research then presents compelling arguments that levels of
unemployment (Adsera 2004; Ellingsaeter 2009; Goldstein et al. 2009) availability of
social security measures (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Crompton and Keown 2009;
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Ellingsaeter 2009; Goldstein et al. 2009; Riche 2004), industrial shifts from
manufacturing to services (Crenshaw et al. 2000; Kongar 2008; Stiglitz 2010), stagnation
and inequality of wages (Budig and England 2001; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Gibbs et al.
2009; Kongar 2008; Stiglitz 2010), demand for female labor (Berik et al. 2009; Boushey
2008; Crenshaw et al. 2000; Hartmann 2009; Kongar 2008), and percentage of workforce
that is female (Adsera 2004; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Boushey 2008; Gibbs et al.
2009; Hartmann 2009; Oppenheimer 1994) all contribute to whether or not a woman is
likely to consider having children and how many. Adsera (2004:19) conducts research
that suggests "whenever employment is low and institutions easily accommodate the
entry-exit of the labor market, fertility rates are around replacement rate." She also finds
that labor markets play a key role in setting wages and employment security. Subsequent
research provides compelling evidence that state-sponsored social insurance can
positively correlate with replacement rate fertility levels (Ellingsaeter 2009).
I contend that individuals and families have opted to mitigate their own individual
social risk in the contemporary labor market by decreasing or eliminating childbearing.
This research fills an important gap in the existing literature by integrating labor market
participation research with that of social insurance and welfare state research. It builds
upon on the SDT by adding a more economic explanation for rising age at first marriage,
age at first child birth, and increased education and labor force participation.
Existing research suggests that when it comes to the changes facing women in
global labor markets, there is much to be said for the influence of the market-oriented
policies of the 1980s and the retrenchment of the welfare state (Berik et al. 2009; EspingAndersen 1999). Cuts in public services and welfare protections increased economic
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insecurity and burdens of reproductive labor on women. These cuts reduced a woman's
ability to hedge her social risks in a free market (Breen 1997). In both domestic and
foreign firms, labor arrangements are becoming more flexible and informal (Berik et al.
2009; Kalleberg 2009; Krinsky 2007). These informal arrangements often leave women
working long hours, without any benefits, and unprotected by national labor laws. "That
part-time work is chosen by some workers as a means of achieving work-life balance
does not imply women's preferences for part-time jobs, but rather the absence of
alternatives to paid work given family responsibilities" (Gash 2008:658). The increasing
demand for cheap, female labor creates a dilemma not only for women, but for the men
who are unable to find jobs or wages sufficient to support a family in a traditional
breadwinner role (Berik et al. 2009; Boushey 2008; Hartmann 2009; Kongar 2008;
Oppenheimer 1994). Thus if fertility decisions are impacted at both the individual and
household levels, then the labor market consequences for men and for women are likely
to interact and create additional increase risk at the household level, thereby putting
downward pressure on fertility. Due to the increasing risks facing both men and women,
women’s full time labor force participation is increasingly vital to household survival.
Women must therefore work longer hours and have less flexibility to exit and re-enter the
labor force due to the birth of a child. This means that, in the absence of publicly funded
childcare, in order to have kids, households must be able to pay a full time caretaker. The
viability of marriage has also been affected, as neoliberal economics appear to have
created a situation in which raising children in a secure environment requires not only
two parents, but two incomes (Warren and Tyagi 2003).
While other scholars have identified a variety of macro-level factors that influence
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fertility, no previous study that I am aware of has fully explored the impact of
neoliberalism-specifically the market and state-based arrangements that have increased
household risk thereby creating downward pressure-on fertility. Previous research
indicates that each of these areas has been altered since the globalization of markets and
the spread of this economic philosophy (Esping-Andersen 1999). However, existing
research is either focused on the impact of market structures or pronatalist and genderegalitarian policies on fertility trends. This paper contends that both areas are equally
important in influencing fertility decisions. By desegregating this research, I hope to help
identify contributing mechanisms that dually influence the rising trend developing over
the past thirty years of below replacement fertility. Additionally, I seek to contribute to
the conversation of the SDT and the economic forces that help foster an environment
conducive to cultural change.
The Neoliberal Impact on State and Social Policy
Neoliberalism was the brain child of Milton Friedman, winner of the 1976 Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (Friedman, M. 1982). This ethos espoused free
markets, increased privatization of the public sector, deregulation of the labor market, and
fiscal responsibility, where the role of the state should be limited to guaranteeing private
property rights and enforcing contracts between individuals (Harvey 2005; Huber and
Stephens 2001; Starke 2008). Changes began at a national level but were quickly
encouraged and adopted at the corporate level.
Friedman's economic philosophy was ushered in to the 1980s by Ronald Reagan
in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. It was felt that free
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markets were the best mechanisms for generating growth, development, and innovation,
which were most often measured by gross domestic product (GDP) (Harvey 2005; Huber
and Stephens 2001; Starke 2008; Stiglitz 2010). In order to allow the markets to
maximize potential, many industries saw a weakening of regulations (Berik et al. 2009;
Stiglitz 2010). Examples of deregulation include reductions in banking oversight,
decreased import safety inspection, and reductions in workforce protections. In addition,
social insurance was minimized or eliminated to meet the goals of modest government
spending, balanced budgets, and reduced national deficits (Huber and Stephens 2001;
Starke 2008). Neoliberal economists also felt that minimizing public sector competition
with the private sector would increase options and decrease costs to the consumers.
Moderate economists would later suggest that the combination of deregulation and
reduction of social insurance left individuals at the mercy of the free market race to
increase GDP (Stiglitz 2010).
With the aid of technological advancements in transportation and communications
and the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989, neoliberalism spread rapidly throughout
the globe (Friedman, T. 2008; 2000) and influenced the social organization of families
(Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Esping-Andersen 1999). Improved transportation and
communication abilities along with population growth brought about an increased
division of labor within society which also extended to the creation of non-family
institutions to organize care activities (Axinn and Yabiku 2001). These new institutions
sought to aid in reproductive responsibilities but therein reorganized the way in which
families were organized. In order to maintain international competitiveness, national
corporations eliminated social benefits to their employees. Companies including General
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Electric, Merck, and Chiquita eliminated pension benefits and pensions as well as health
care plans during "corporate mergers" (Schultz 2000). Labor force flexibility became key
and accomplished in several ways. Employers maintained flexibility through short term
contracts and part time work, often referred to as "precarious work" (Kalleberg 2009:2;
Krinsky 2007). This type of work is characterized by the risky relationships formed
between employers and employees. There has also been a decline in attachment to a
single employer, an increase in long-term spells of unemployment, increased perceptions
of job insecurity, and growth of nonstandard work in an informal economy (Kalleberg
2009).
During the 1980s and 1990s there was also a massive industrial shift as a response
to the lifting of spatial limits around the globe (Friedman, T. 2000; Kongar 2008; Stiglitz
2010; Tilly and Tilly 1994). Manufacturing fled the developed nations and rapidly
expanding service markets for developing nations with a surplus of low-skilled, lowwage and often female labor force (Adsera 2004; Berik et al. 2009; Brewster and
Rindfuss 2000; Budig and England 2001; Crenshaw et al. 2000; Gibbs et al. 2009;
Hartmann 2009; Konger 2008). In its place came the growth of the service industry
(Esping-Andersen 1999). The consequences of this industry shift have been "mass
unemployment and stagnant earnings" (Esping-Andersen 1999:13). Women's labor force
participation was also on the rise as men's jobs were disappearing and wages were
shrinking. As mobility spread, so did inequality. Wages were driven down globally and
across industries (Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Gibbs et al. 2009; Kongar 2008; Stiglitz 2010).
The highly skilled manufacturing jobs were disappearing and being replaced with lowskill, low-wage and often female-centric jobs.
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The Social Embeddedness of Markets
While writing 30 years prior to the implementation of neoliberalism, Karl Polanyi
(1944) warned of the social dislocation and mass inequality that would arise if market
systems were disembedded from society. These dislocations included unemployment,
homelessness, poverty, and an insecure malaise. He described the political and economic
changes brought upon the world by the Industrial Revolution and viewed the ideology of
a self-regulating free market as flawed and historically failed. These flaws included
massive social dislocations that could only be prevented by government intervention. In
addition, he hypothesized that the pace of change and development greatly affect the
severity of social consequences – consequences that primarily impacted those most
marginalized in society. Speed and dislocation were positively correlated, as communities
and markets had little time to adapt to changing market demands and population
pressures. Polanyi (1944:39) hypothesized that "the rate of change is often of no less
importance than the direction of change itself." Contemporary authors would reflect on
this same time frame and view the same free market failures, only to be dismayed as
market failures continued to occur cyclically-most recently on a global level in 2008
(Krugman 2009; Stiglitz 2010).
Polanyi (1944) also introduced the concept of embeddedness -- that market
economies were inherently social due to the commodification of human labor.
Additionally, he argues that markets are socially constructed and depend upon social and
cultural processes including trust, reciprocity, and shared understandings. "The economic
system is . . . a mere function of social organization" (Polanyi 1944:52). Hence, Polanyi
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is critiquing market liberalism for its ideological practices that attempt to disembed the
market from said social processes which then lead to the consequences of social
dislocation. These consequences included physical dislocation from homes and jobs,
mass unemployment, hunger, and poverty but also the intangible consequences of
insecurity and fear as generated by reliance on an unpredictable and unforgiving free
market system. While both the tangible and intangible consequences would seem to
place downward pressure on fertility, I am primarily concerned with the insecurity and
risk that can be generated when markets are disembedded from society. Additionally, I
borrow Polanyi's notion that markets are not inherently evil but can function successfully
when boundaries that prevent social dislocations are set up and enforced by the state as
"regulation and markets grew up together" (Polanyi 1944:71).
Hedging Risk in Society
Richard Breen (1997) presents the social consequences that may occur from an
unregulated, free market in a more contemporary setting with a unique analysis of the
concept of risk in society. The process of transferring social risk for an individual is one
in which a person holds proxy in a larger group either through reciprocity or payment,
and from which they may seek redistribution. This is often done through the family, but
can also be achieved through state intervention. The rise of the welfare state in the mid
1960s through the 1970s was an attempt by advanced democracies to promote equality,
security, and employment opportunities for all citizens. The creation of these elaborate
safety nets also mitigated social risks. Examples included food aid, child and health care
subsidies, and unemployment distributions. Breen (1997) then suggests that individuals
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now bear the primary burden whereas previous generations had a shared commitment to
invest in society as a whole, thus sharing risk.
When markets are socially disembedded as feared by Polanyi, Breen (1997) finds
the family to be the number one resource for hedging social risk. He is therefore
primarily concerned when familial intervention is no longer adequate. Examples include
the rise of single-parent families, the inability of the traditional male breadwinner family
model to provide enough resources, as well as the overall stagnation and decline in wages
over the past 30 years. Each example poses a change in family structure as well as
increasing economic insecurity. Secondarily, he is concerned with the elimination of
state intervention and social insurance and the deregulation of market institutions that
would mitigate social risk. When individuals are forced to turn to the private market for
basic needs such as child care, education, or health care, a monthly payment is required,
thus creating a reliance on the labor market for not only payment in the form of wages
but for affordable services as well. In addition, the reduction or elimination of statesponsored social insurance programs including food aid, supplemental daycare and
healthcare stipends, and unemployment or Social Security wages also increases
dependence upon the private market not only for wages but for costly services.
The volatility of a flexible and global market can also cause insecurity (EspingAndersen 1999; Polanyi 1944). Additionally, insecurity arises from things commonly
associated with neoliberalism including flexibility, short-term contracts, and a rise in
part-time labor. Therefore, workers cannot be truly decommodified from labor until they
can opt out of work when necessary without fear of repercussion while also maintaining
the ability to re-enter the workforce when desired. This can include paid sick or
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maternity leave and access to health benefits that could prevent economic hardship. The
elimination of labor market repercussions through adequate social insurance could
prevent the social dislocation, insecurity, and fear associated with a free market system
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Polanyi 1944).
Breen (1997) also finds that this shift in the burden of risk has not only impacted
the individual by way of the family, but through the welfare state and the state-marketemployee relationship. Examples include the current globalization of free markets which
has encouraged and made possible the increased de-regulation, privatization, short-term
contracts, part-time labor, and general work force flexibility (Kalleberg 2009; Krimsky
2007). Each of these labor market changes has shifted the burden of risk away from the
employer as a cost-saving mechanism and onto the individual employee (EspingAndersen 1999).
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH AND METHODS
The Neoliberal Impact on Fertility
The neoliberal philosophy can be thus broken down into two categories: the
change in state-market-employee relationships and the retrenchment of the welfare state.
Both of these outcomes have increased household social risk-first through the individual
and secondly through the household unit. Within each of these areas, a mechanism can
be found with which to measure the implementation and outcomes of said policy
decisions. State-market-employee relationships are no longer about security and
protection. Rather,the state has opted out of the market via deregulation and privatization
of national industries while the flexibility businesses perceive as necessary to remain
competitive in a fast-paced global economy has increased the level of market risk an
employee assumes when entering into a labor contract (Esping-Andersen 1999). In a
European study of labor market practices, Burgoon and Dekker (2010) found that parttime and temporary work increase labor market risk as well as subjective employment
and income insecurities. Giesecke and Grob (2004) also discover the existence of a
wage penalty and barrier to permanent, full-time employment present in temporary and
fixed-term contracts.
For women, this increased risk diminishes the likelihood that she will choose
childbearing over the labor market (Gash 2008). Additionally, the decrease in wages that
accompany the shift from industrial to service labor and the rapidly expanding labor pool
around the world have also created higher levels of insecurity and inability to financially

20
provide for a child once the woman has left the workplace, even if only temporarily. I
contend that the mechanism by which the impact of these state-market-employee
relationship changes can be measured is the aforementioned increased labor market risk.
Operationalizing the labor market risk mechanism includes the increased risk that
accompanies market liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. Additional risks
occur with high levels of unemployment, part-time employment, contractual and selfemployment, insufficient wages as well as the retrenchment of government in dealing
with labor security and social insurance issues.
To compound this risk, the retrenchment of the welfare state brought about
diminished aid for society as a whole (Esping-Andersen 1999). I utilize the definition of
welfare state retrenchment as provided by Peter Starke (2008:13): "a political decision to
reduce the level of social protection guaranteed by the state." With state level reductions,
the household unit became the primary source for minimizing against risk. This concept
is also known as "familial welfare regime" in that the way social risk is distributed
between states, markets, and families "makes a huge difference" (Esping-Andersen
1999:36). There was also a reduction of employee benefits that accompany decreased
spending at both the national and corporate levels, each of which creates a higher burden
for both individuals and families, thereby also decreasing the likelihood of choosing to
have children. I also contend that the retrenchment of the welfare state and the shrinking
role of government in societal protection can best be measured through the mechanism of
increased household risk. Operationalizing the household risk mechanism includes two
types of benefits: those that protect the individual worker and those that protect the
family as a household unit with specific emphasis towards children. Examples of work-
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related social insurance include unemployment, pension, and maternity benefits.
Household-related social insurance examples include the availability of publicly
subsidized or universal health and child care. Areas of maternity and healthcare may
have some overlapping functions pertaining to both individual workers as well as
household units. Figure 2 demonstrates the duality of increased labor market risk and
increased household risk resulting in the downward pressure being placed on fertility.

Figure 2. The Neoliberal Impact on Fertility
Four Ideal Types of Neoliberal Adaptation
Using Polanyi's insight that both the speed and degree of structural changes
impact society, I hypothesize that the same is true with regard to the downward pressure
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of neoliberal mechanisms on fertility. The unique combinations of speed and degree of
adaptation to neoliberalism can be broken into four ideal types. For each combination I
suggest a unique hypothesis that indicates expected fertility patterns to emerge when
applied to case studies. Figure 3 reflects each of the ideal cases to be examined.
Speed is a crucial element and can affect the way in which a society adapts to a
structural change. The more rapid the change, the more dramatic the impact as people
adjust to new expectations, limits, and benefits. Polanyi (1944) used the example of
migration during the Industrial Revolution as masses of agrarian workers moved to urban
centers looking for work. However, due to the speed of this migration, neither the job
market nor the housing market could keep up with the demand. Countries making a rapid
change to market liberalization, increasing service sector, vanishing industrial markets,
and welfare retrenchment will see the most dramatic drops in fertility, even if only
temporarily due to postponement.

Figure 3. Ideal Types of Neoliberal Adaptation
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Degree will also impact fertility due to the nature and austerity of these economic
changes. Countries adopting and implementing a high degree of neoliberalism will be
altering the state's contract with its citizens thereby changing the structure, security, and
expectations with which people provide for themselves and their families. Below I
provide four hypotheses based on the four unique combinations of speed and degree of
neoliberal adaptation.
H1: Slow adaptation and a low degree of degree of neoliberalism will continue fertility
decline but at a modest pace and will allow for quicker recuperation to
replacement levels. The slow pace allows ample time to accommodate a low level
of structural change. In addition, as national or global economic circumstances
change, fertility rates may adjust themselves accordingly.
H2: Slow adaptation and a high degree of neoliberalism will continue any existing
fertility decline at a modest pace and will sustain below replacement fertility
levels with modest recovery. The slow pace allows time to adapt to structural
changes. However, the severity and nature of those changes may impede fertility
levels to return to replacement levels.
H3: Fast adaptation and a low degree of neoliberalism will accelerate the downward
trend initially, but allow for a quicker return to replacement levels. The fast
adaptation to structural changes may cause an initially sharp decline in fertility, if
only due to postponement, while a low level of adaptation would be a less
dramatic change and allow fertility rates to recover.
H4: Fast adaptation and a high degree of neoliberalism will accelerate the downward
trend and allow only modest, if any, upward trend toward replacement levels.
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These would be the countries that are most likely to have sustainable lowest-low
fertility due to the shock of severe changes in such a short time frame.
A Historical Comparison
In order to begin testing both the neoliberal mechanisms of downward pressure on
fertility and the impact of speed and degree of adaptation, I present a historical
comparative of empirical policy decisions made starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s
to the present. I use this time frame based on Friedman's 1976 Nobel Prize in
conjunction with the 1980 elections of neoliberalism's two biggest proponents: Thatcher
and Reagan.
Using the four ideal conditions in the model presented above, I identify four case
studies as candidates to test each hypothesis. So as to minimize geographical and cultural
noise, I have selected four cases within Western Europe. I will address the applicability
to other countries in the findings section. After an extensive review of European history
and policy research, I was able to select four countries as representative of the four ideal
types presented in the model above. These selections were based not only on saturation
within the research, but confirmed theoretical framework research as well (EspingAndersen 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). Each country has been selected based on
how well it fits the speed and degree criteria. In addition, each case study represents a
country with democratic values as is often necessary for allowing women control over
reproductive issues as well as controlling for some political and cultural similarities.
In order to understand the speed and degree of adaptation to neoliberalism, I
conduct a comparison of changes made, starting in 1980 to the present, in each country
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based on the two prior mechanisms that apply downward pressure to fertility: labor
market risk and household risk. Finally, I analyze the fertility patterns in each country
during the period of neoliberal policy reform to analyze whether and how neoliberal
policies contributed to observed fertility trends. All TFR data is provided by the World
Research Institute at earthtrends.wri.org and derived from the Population Division of the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat located in
the World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision (2007).
Sweden will serve as a test case for H1. Previous research concurs that it is a
prototypical case for examining social democracies (Esping-Andersen 1999; Huber and
Stephens 2001; Starke 2008). In addition, having one of the most universally guaranteed
social insurance systems would also leave this country highly exposed to risk under the
adoption of neoliberal policies. Sweden also has a history of expanding programs,
especially those that benefit women's equality, at the same time other European countries
are shrinking similar programs. Sweden was able to escape the recession of 1991-1992
with modest social insurance cuts, many of which were restored by the end of the decade
(Bonoli and Emmenegger 2010; Huber and Stephens 2001; Starke 2008). In addition, the
state chose to preserve the policies that most directly impacted the female labor market
and working families while deregulating and liberalizing their markets to be competitive
with the rest of the world (Bonoli and Emmenegger 2010; Huber and Stephens 2001;
Starke 2008). Generally speaking, policy adaptations to the neoliberal ethos were
modest, occurred over a long period of time, and in many cases, were fully reversed.
Germany presents the ideal case for testing H2. Dually referred to as a "Christian
democracy" (Huber and Stephens 2001:35) or a "conservative welfare regime (Esping-
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Andersen 1999:81), social insurance policies have always played a key role in the
government contract with its citizens. However, the direct impact of economically
absorbing Eastern Germany, along with the global integration of its markets after the fall
of Communism, promoted the adoption of strict austerity measures (Huber and Stephens
2001; Prasad 2006). Starke (2008:158) considers Germany one of the "pioneers of
welfare state retrenchment", starting as early as 1975. Over the next 10 years, cuts were
made in a broad spectrum of policy areas including pension index adjustments,
unemployment insurance reductions, child benefits, social assistance, and housing (Starke
2008). At the same time, employee and employer contributions to social insurance
programs rose from 26.5% to 41.2% (Starke 2008). Germany resisted political backlash
by creating implementation delays and reducing benefits across the spectrum rather than
specifically targeting entire programs. While women's labor force participation rose to
64% by 1994, gender-egalitarian policies were modest at best (Huber and Stephens
2001). Lack of child care essentially forced mothers out of the labor force and into the
realm of unemployed. Meanwhile, family policies upheld the traditional "malebreadwinner model" (Fagnani 2002: 111). These policies also increased women’s
dependence on wage earning husbands. Even for highly skilled professional women, the
cost of working while children are young often outweighs the cost of dropping out of the
labor force. The severity of policy changes within both the labor market and welfare
state were high and widespread but occurred over an extended period of time.
France, having adopted a low level of neoliberalism similar to Sweden while
rapidly trying to keep up with the growing global market as did the United Kingdom, is
the third selection and used for examining the validity of H3. The "statist" approach to
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capitalism pursued by France suggests there is something unique about their approach to
contemporary economic demands (Schmidt 2003:526). Deregulation of the labor market
included increased flexibility in hiring and firing and performance-scaled pay (Schmidt
2003). France was also able to maintain a hands-on role in business via state-led policies
on labor, education, and social insurance. Social insurance changes between 1980 and
2000 look quite different than Sweden or Germany. Taxes were raised, individual
contributions were increased, active labor market policies (ALMP) were created, and
eligibility requirements were tightened (Swank 2002). The state also began to play an
active role in community-funded day care centers, family allowances, and support for the
long-term unemployed. Generally speaking, changes in the labor market and the
retrenchment of the welfare state have been modest but swift.
The United Kingdom presents the final example and will be used to test H4. As
one of the two primary proponents of neoliberalism, the "liberal market" (Schmidt
2003:526) or liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1999) policy changes in the UK
highlight one of the most dramatic shifts in the world and the most dramatic shift in
Europe (Starke 2008). Within three years of taking office, Thatcher implemented severe
austerity measures known as "the big bang" that slashed everything from health care to
education to housing subsidies (Schmidt 2003). Additional changes included
deregulating businesses, eliminating state regulatory agencies, contracting private
regulatory agencies, and increasing employers' ability to hire and fire (Schmidt 2003).
Through a series of tax breaks and educational campaigns, private investment in the open
market or a corporate account was encouraged, placing more risk and responsibility on
the individual (Kus 2006). Generally speaking, the UK is last in "employment
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protection, length of worker employment, and provision of vocational training" (Schmidt
2003:543-44). The degree of adaptation was as severe as in Germany with periods of
extremely fast implementation of these changes.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Sweden
Overview
Sweden represents an ideal country that experienced low levels of neoliberal
adaptation at a slow pace. Based on the ideal types of neoliberal adaptation, I would
anticipate finding continuation of trends, relative recovery without dramatic declines, and
the absence of lowest low fertility periods.
By the 1990s it became clear that the global market was rapidly expanding and
Sweden would have to adapt. Unemployment rose above 8%, economic growth turned
negative, and the Swedish krona was devalued due to international interest rates and to
attract foreign investment and remain competitive within their industries (Starke 2008).
Such policy decisions are consistent with the market liberalization associated with
neoliberalism as an attempt to increase capital flow. In Sweden, welfare models tend to
focus individuals as the main recipient of social insurance, and its labor market strategy
includes a strong public sector (DiPrete, Goux, Maurin, and Tablin 2001). The state
limits the demands of employers with gender-egalitarian parental leave rights that
encourage men and women to aid in childcare (Warren, Pascall, and Fox 2010).
Increased Labor Market Risk
Labor market relationships in Sweden have changed in a number of ways. The
massive social services public sector was opened up to private vendors albeit under strict
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government regulation (Huber and Stephens 2001). This not only increased competition
but provided consumers with more choice and more control over the services they
received. There was also an increase public sector growth which was primarily filled
with women seeking to enter the labor market (Rosen 1996). These jobs were meant to
fill employment needs while also expanding social insurance services. Conservative
party members also sought tax reductions and budget austerity that would eventually lead
to modest cutbacks in social insurance (Merriman 2010). However, raises in employee
contributions and market incentives to remain employed helped mitigate social insurance
reductions.
In order to compete in the global labor market, employers demanded deregulation
of labor laws and cited the need for flexibility to quickly move with unanticipated
economic cycles. Swedish employers implemented the use of fixed-term contracts (FTC)
as did many other European nations. These FTC allowed businesses greater flexibility in
hiring and firing practices as well as needed flexibility to cope with cycles of high
demand and seasonality (DiPrete et al. 2001). Bonoli and Emmenegger (2010:830) use
the term "flexicurity" to describe a state that seeks to provide labor market flexibility
while providing security to employees. They cite Sweden as an effective implementor of
this model by providing flexible labor contracts while securing generous unemployment
benefits in conjunction with ALMP which emphasize full employment practices (Bonoli
and Emmenegger 2010). Research suggests that increased labor market risk was incurred
as the Swedish labor market was subjected to market liberalization, privatization, and
FTC. However, the continued regulation by the state and ALMP sought to mitigate these
risks.
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Increased Household Risk
Sweden has a unique combination of high fertility and high rates of female labor
market participation among advanced countries (Rosen 1996). When it comes to the
retrenchment of the welfare state in Sweden, what may seem severe locally is still
significantly more comprehensive than anywhere else in the world outside of
Scandinavia. Heading into the 1980s with what was considered universal coverage in
unemployment and health related benefits, unemployment rates remained between 1-3%
until the start of the 1990s (Huber and Stephens 2001). Additionally, the late 1980s saw
the expansion of "gender-egalitarian policies" including parental leave, public daycare,
paid sick leave, and paid vacation time (Huber and Stephens 2001:243).
While the rest of world started reducing social insurance in the 1980s, Sweden
responded as if the market changes were cyclical and would soon self-correct. Sick pay
was reduced from 90% to 80% as was unemployment insurance (Starke 2008). Pension
indexes were also reduced. Temporary cuts were made in parental benefits and child
allowances in 1995-97 but fully restored by 1998 (Duvander and Andersson 2006; Starke
2008). In general, Sweden protected the household from increased risk via short-term
retraction of social benefits and promotion and protection of gender-egalitarian policies.
Fertility Trends
The impact of neoliberalism on total fertility rates generally supports the above
assertions. Increased household risk can be evidenced by the decline in social insurance
when sick leave, unemployment pay, and parental benefit are cutback which then appear
to adversely impact fertility rates (Duvander and Andersson 2006). The most noticeable
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decline comes during the period of high unemployment and welfare state retrenchment as
these two mechanisms merge together. Yet we start to see recovery by the end of the
decade after flexcurity practices including ALMP were implemented, household benefits
were reinstated, and the security provided by expected levels of social insurance were
restored. See Figure 4.3 Overall, Sweden's ability to recover from a fertility decline
appears to support H1 due to the low adaptation of neoliberalism. The slow speed at
which they adapted appears to mitigate sharp declines with the exception of the mid
1990s when the most radical changes were implemented and then repealed, thus
correlating with the most dramatic fertility decline and recovery in this 35-year time
frame. Sweden appears to have effectively mitigated increases in labor market and
household risk with its use of state regulation, ALMP, and strong social benefits and
gender egalitarian policies. Families have thus had minimal downward pressure on
fertility decisions from the adaptation of neoliberal policies.
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Figure 4. Sweden, 1975-2010, Total Fertility Rates
3 In order to highlight the changes occurring within each country, I do not show the TFR range from 01.19 as there is no activity. Instead, I focus on a range that is inclusive of lowest-low fertility at 1.3 and
replacement fertility at 2.1.
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Germany
Overview
Germany represents an ideal country that experienced high levels of neoliberal
adaptation at a slow pace. Based on the ideal types of neoliberal adaptation, I would
anticipate finding modest yet persistent decline, only possible recovery, and periods of
lowest low fertility.
In Germany, strict dismissal regulations were an important source of labor market
protection with public employees granted life-long employment (Giesecke and Grob
2004). General social assistance and unemployment insurance were merged into one
benefit, effectively decreasing income benefits (Clasen and Clegg 2004). This new allencompassing benefit also reduced eligibility duration from 32 to 12 months. Previous
studies suggest that wages and unemployment have been negatively impacted by changes
in labor market relationships.
Increased Labor Market Risks
The liberalization of financial markets started in in Germany in 1995 as well as
the privatization of state owned businesses (Schmidt 2003). German employers fought
for privatization of social services, benefit reductions, and limits to income redistribution
based on the need to compete internationally (Swank 2002). FTC accounted for 8% of
total employment in Germany by 2000 (Gash and McGinnity 2007). However, Germany
had strong collective bargaining institutions including both traditional trade unions to
address wage issues and work councils to address non-wage conditions including
overtime and nonstandard employment contracting (Burgoon and Raess 2009). In 2001,
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63% of employees were covered by unions and in 2003, 53% were covered by work
councils (Burgoon and Raess 2009).
Giesecke and Grob (2004) conducted a study specifically looking at the impact of
precarious labor market relationships in the form of temporary employment. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s this type of employment was on the rise. Findings indicate that men
in temporary jobs earn 18% less than men in permanent jobs while women earn 10% less
than their permanent counterparts (Giesecke and Grob 2004). These wage gaps only
increase in public sector temporary employment where it is used more often and where
permanent positions are heavily protected and insured. The other significant correlation
discovered in this study is the interrelated nature of past and future employment with
currently holding a temporary position. If a person, regardless of gender, has previously
been unemployed, they have an increased probability of currently holding a temporary
job (Giesecke and Grob 2004). Additionally, there is a significant probability that they
will become unemployed again once the temporary job has ended rather then moving on
to a permanent position. Both the likelihood of currently holding a temporary job due to
previous unemployment and becoming unemployed again after temporary employment
has ended are magnified by multiple periods of unemployment and having held multiple
temporary jobs (Giesecke and Grob 2004). This pattern creates a "chain of uncertainty"
for workers in the German labor market (Giesecke and Grob 2004:376). The
implementation of neoliberal policies that allowed the increased use of temporary
employees and FTC increased risk and shifted the burden or risk onto individual workers.
The role of women in the labor market has been an adjustment from nonemployment to part-time employment. Wage research suggests that "changes in
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employment patterns" and "relative earnings positions" still leave women disadvantaged
and discriminated against (Eberharter 2003:527). This environment only restricts a
woman's ability to work for pay while reinforcing her non-paid role in the home.
Additionally, women with higher education often find themselves restricted to temporary
jobs and the inequalities that inherently accompany those positions (Giesecke and Grob
2004). Thus, as child bearers and primary caregivers, women find that they are dually
subjected to increased risk at both the individual and household level, impacting fertility
decisions.
In summary, Germany was exposed to multiple changes in a broad array of fields
that all increased labor market risk. These changes included market liberalization,
privatization, and increased use of FTC and temporary employment, both of which
perpetuated chains of uncertainty. Additionally, gender inequalities have not been
mitigated by state intervention.
Increased Household Risk
The reunification with East Germany created an external shock to the West
German welfare state, increasing demands on all programs dramatically with an initial set
of social insurance cuts. Unemployment benefits were cut from 90% in 1975 to 60% by
the 1990s (Huber and Stephens 2001). The entitlement period was shortened and
eligibility requirements were increased (Starke 2008). Sick pay shrank from 100% to
80% (Starke 2008). However, during the mid 1990s there was modest expansion to some
family policy areas including long-term care insurance (Starke 2008).
Paid maternity leave was replaced with a gender-neutral education allowance that
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was equivalent to 25% of the average female blue collar worker's wages (Huber and
Stephens 2001). Child care facilities were basically non-existent for children under age 3
while services for children 3 years old to school age were not full-day programs and thus
insufficient to meet full-time needs (Huber and Stephens 2001). During the 1990s,
constitutional courts implemented some basic subsistence levels to aid families caring for
children. Tax deductions for low-income families were raised and the child benefit was
increased but only for the first child (Huber and Stephens 2001). Again, these benefits
were structured to benefit traditional two-parent families in which the mother stays home
and provides all social services for the family (Fagnani 2002). The general theme of
welfare state retrenchment in Germany forced households to absorb the majority of risk
with the reduction of so many welfare programs and entitlement benefits.
Fertility Trends
Fertility trends in Germany suggest that adherence to the traditional malebreadwinner roles, increased utilization of precarious employment relationships, and
broad welfare state retrenchment has given German women a clear choice-labor market
OR childbearing. Labor market risk has clearly risen with privatization and increased use
of FTC and temporary work leading to a chain of uncertainty. Increased household risk is
politically and culturally enforced with regard to women via reduced social insurance and
labor market restrictions. The sustainability of lowest-low fertility for the past 20 years
appears to support H2 in that the severity and nature of economic changes has impeded
total fertility rates' return to replacement levels. The most severe drop can be found
between 1985-95 which includes the reunification of East and West Germany. See Figure
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5. Overall, the retrenchment of the German state from the market as well as the welfare
system has placed a large portion of labor market risk on individuals while the household
absorbs increasing social demands. Under such neoliberal pressure, families find
themselves forced to choose between labor market participation or having children.
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Figure 5. Germany, 1975-2010, Total Fertility Rates
France
Overview
France represents an ideal country that experienced low levels of neoliberal
adaptation at a fast pace. Based on the ideal types of neoliberal adaptation, I would
anticipate finding modest levels of decline, possible sharp declines with ease of recovery,
and the absence of lowest low fertility periods.
France took a different approach to the economic downturn of the 1970s and
modified their own take on neoliberal answers. Each change represented a change
towards neoliberalism via financial market liberalization, business deregulation and
privatization, and labor market decentralization (Schmidt 2003). The French state pursed
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"competitive disinflation" and was also forced to devalue the franc (Kus 2006:515).
When it came to industry and the deflating demand for manufacturing by industrialized
nations, France chose to abandon its interventionist dirigisme policies (Schmidt 2003). In
1986, nationalized businesses were sold off and wage and price controls were eliminated
(Kus 2006; Merriman 2010). These market liberalizations increased sources of funding
for businesses and created new levels of independence (Schmidt 2003). Additionally, in
France, welfare models tended to focus the household unit as the main recipient of social
insurance (DiPrete et al. 2001). A key policy decision that supported the French
household was the reduction of maximum full-time working hours to 35 hours per week
(Warren et al. 2010). This policy provided men and women an equal opportunity to help
with unpaid work and childcare.
Increased Labor Market Risk
When it came to industrial relationships, trade unions were often overshadowed
by a dominant state. By 1990, France eliminated the state-run system of wage
bargaining, thus decreasing union membership and authority (Schmidt 2003). Unions
represented about 56% of workers and wage negotiations were typically more
confrontational and less successful than in Germany (Gash and McGinnity 2007). It was
through this "enhanced" role that the French state maintained more control over all
economic decision-making and setting themselves on a unique path via "statism"
(Schmidt 2003:533). In 1986, France experienced a "little-bang" of economic boosts
with the replacement of state funding and bank debt with equity financing, sell-offs in
industry and banking, and a decline of public ownership and decrease in public
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employment; from 10.5% in 1985 to 5.3% in 2000 (Schmidt 2003). However, in statist
fashion, government officials played a key role in dividing up shares and hand-selecting
"hard-core investors" for the conversion from public to private (Schmidt 2003:534).
Additionally, public utilities remained as such with an exceptions in telecommunications
and modest deregulations in electricity and transportation (Schmidt 2003).
The nature of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) impacted state-marketemployee relationships as well as the ability of national industries to compete in an
international atmosphere. French creation of IRAs during the dismantling and
privatization of national industries focused on several key goals. Policy-makers sought to
adapt to changing international and European market demands while protecting national
interests. Regulators were chosen in light of their political background and knowledge of
state interests. Between 2002-2006, "50% came from the grandes écoles and 33% from
the grands corps" (Thatcher 2007:1035). These politically groomed regulators were
more adept at upholding state interests over corporate interests.
The French government also maintained significant powers over key industries
post-privatization and actively denied access to the French market by undesirable
overseas competitors (Thatcher 2007). Generally speaking, France used its statist
approach to protect national corporate and employee interests. It maintained a large
public sector and remained heavily involved in the realm of private business as well
(Prasad 2006). Taxation remained stable and non-volatile resulting in sufficiently high
tax levels for maintaining state-sponsored services (Prasad 2006). Additionally, the
legitimacy of government involvement in the market translated into corporate social
responsibility. This then translated into companies aiding in the "general interests of
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society," "stimulating employment," enacting "proactive policies towards female
workers," and guaranteeing basic social rights (Antal and Sobczak 2007:17-19).
Labor market relationships in France were mixed. Businesses and unions were
focused on creating employment security and high mobility barriers but often left the
young, new workforce and the unemployed highly vulnerable (DiPrete et al. 2001).
Thus, there became a high demand for FTC. As in Germany, FTC gained prominence,
growing from 1.4% of salaried employment in 1983 to 10.8% in 2000 (Blanchard and
Landier 2002). FTC account for 13% of total employment by 2000 (Gash and McGinnity
2007). The higher percentage in France appears to stem from the more generous
employment insurance, thus enticing businesses to circumvent the welfare state with
these non-traditional work contracts. However, unlike Sweden, renewal of these
contracts was highly unheard of (DiPrete et al. 2001). The improved flexibility granted
to businesses appeared to increase worker turnover and the impact on the younger
workforce was negative (Blanchard and Landier 2002). With regard to women, 55%
were active labor market participants and only 20% held part-time jobs (Gash 2008).
This indicates that the French labor market is more accommodating to women who want
or need to work in secure full-time jobs than other European counterparts.
The overall picture in France is painted by the high levels of statist intervention in
everything from privatization to politically minded deregulation. Additionally, limited
market liberalization and the government legitimation of social protection allowed
national corporate interests to remain profitable and socially responsible which mitigated
the individual labor market risks.
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Increased Household Risk
In 1988 French policy makers enacted "revenu minimum d'insertion (minimum
insertion income or RMI)" providing basic income support to socially excluded groups
including the long-term unemployed (Swank 2002:71). In 2001, a "job bonus" was
created that acted as a supplement for families earning less than 140% of the minimum
wage (Gilbert 2002). These policy changes represent a move towards economic austerity
while providing a high level of social protection for all citizens.
In the realm of gender-egalitarian policies, France has had a fairly successful
history. Due to a labor shortage in 1978, France began providing "community funded
day care centers" to entice women to work (Fagnani 2002:110). Additionally, the
Ministry of National Education runs nursery schools for children age 2-6 while also
providing generous child care allowances to aid families (Fagnani 2002). Overall,
France invested 1.2% of GPD to state-sponsored childcare policies which benefited 38%
of children and ensuring that 99.2% of children ages 3-5 were able to attend nursery
school (Gash 2008). The primary drawback to French family policy is that eligibility and
benefits decrease after the birth of the first child (Fagnani 2002). Household risk in
France was minimized by the state's continued role in providing social insurance and
promoting gender egalitarian labor policies.
Fertility Trends
Fertility trends in France appear supportive of H3. Policy adaptation speed
appears quicker than Sweden but the initial decline in fertility is modestly less dramatic.
The low level of neoliberal adaptation in France correlates with a less dramatic change in
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fertility between 1975-2010 and has allowed fertility rates to recover, though still
modestly below replacement levels. See Figure 6. In the case of France, it would appear
that the high level of state intervention in both the labor market and provision of social
insurance mitigate the speed of implementation while the low degree of adaptation
mitigates any dramatic or sustained low fertility rates. Statism appears to have played a
significant role in minimizing social risks incurred by French citizens under neoliberal
policy adaptation. While markets were liberalized and deregulated and welfare benefits
scaled back, the way in which the state was able to maintain social security diverted most
of the downward pressure on families' fertility decisions.
2.20
2.00
1.87

1.86

1.80

1.76

1.71

TFR

1.89

1.88

1.81

1.60
1.40

2005-2010

2000-2005

1995-2000

1990-1995

1985-1990

1980-1985

1975-1980

1.20

Figure 6. France, 1975-2010, Total Fertility Rates
The United Kingdom
Overview
The United Kingdom represents an ideal country that experienced high levels of
neoliberal adaptation at a fast pace. Based on the ideal types of neoliberal adaptation, I
would anticipate finding sharp declines, only possible recovery, and periods of lowest
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low fertility. This is the country's TFR that I contend will be the most severely impacted
based on speed and degree of neoliberal adaptation.
The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 brought about radical changes in The
United Kingdom (Kus 2006; Merriman 2010). Manufacturing dried up and nationalized
services were sold off, causing unemployment to reach 12% by 1983 (Merriman 2010).
Twenty-five state-owned firms were sold off in the private market (Prasad 2006).
Thatcher's neoliberal policies sought to reduce state intervention in the market, minimize
the role of trade unions, and eliminate welfare programs (Kus 2006). These goals were
achieved through privatization, upholding business interests over general interests,
progressive taxes, and a more redistributive welfare state that created opposition between
the middle and lower classes (Prasad 2006).
Increased Labor Market Risk
In the UK, the state has removed itself from all forms of business and industrial
interests with the largest decline in the public sector of all four case studies (Prasad
2006). Tax rates have been volatile and tied closely with political party power. IRAs
acted as licensing bodies without any direct control thereafter. Regulators typically came
from the private market and a competitive mindset, with only 1-3% coming from a
political background (Thatcher 2007). British IRAs opened markets to overseas
competitors, withdrew from regulation, and promoted effective competition without
protecting national interests (Thatcher 2007). Job dismissal legislation in the UK was
abolished throughout the 1980s and 1990s and what remained was viewed as highly
unrestrictive (Giesecke and Grob 2004).
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The German study on the impact of precarious temporary employment and the
chain of uncertainty was also conducted in the UK with many similar findings. Males in
temporary jobs are subjected to a 21% wage penalty while women are only subjected to a
2% wage penalty compared to permanent counterparts (Giesecke and Grob 2004). A key
difference between Germany and the UK is that there does not appear to be a wage
penalty in the public sector in the UK as found in Germany. Unfortunately, the chain of
uncertainty is equally apparent and, in some instances, more pronounced in the UK. This
indicates that both the likelihood of currently holding a temporary job due to previous
unemployment and becoming unemployed again after temporary employment has ended
are magnified by multiple periods of unemployment and having held multiple temporary
jobs (Giesecke and Grob 2004). The most significant gender difference is that women in
the UK with a higher education and qualifications also appear more restricted to
temporary employment and corresponding work uncertainty and wage penalties.
In the UK, 66% of women were active in the labor market and 40% of those
women only held part-time jobs (Gash 2008). The low wages and gender inequalities in
labor law continue to reinforce the traditional male-breadwinner model. Prior to the birth
of her first child, a woman in the UK can expect to make approximate 91% of her male
counterpart and only 67% after childbearing (Warren et al. 2010). Such findings also
suggest that women in the UK who choose to have children will only earn 50% of the
wages of her male counterpart over a lifetime (Warren et al. 2010). Overall, the UK
demonstrates the largest gender and family pay gaps relative to other advanced industrial
nations (Gash 2008).
Changes in regulation agencies from national to corporate interests, increased
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flexibility of dismissal regulation, and increased use of FTC and temporary employees
perpetuated chains of uncertainty. Thus, the individual level of risk in the labor market
rose significantly with research suggesting that women bore a large share of that risk.
Increased Household Risk
The retrenchment of the welfare state in the United Kingdom was ideologically
rather than need-based driven and more widespread than any other country in Europe
(Huber and Stephens 2001). This ideological motivation differs from need-based
motivation in that political agendas and political party power shape decisions more than
economic principles, historical contexts, or popular opinions. Everything from pensions
to sick pay to unemployment compensation was reduced and privatized (Huber and
Stephens 2001). Between 1980 and 1990 there was a 60% increase in program
dependents and a 200% increase in claims while social expenditures by the state were
being cut (Kus 2006). Between 1979 and 1995 reductions included work accident
compensation: 70% to 20%; sick pay: 60% to 20%; and unemployment compensation:
60% to 24% (Starke 2008). These cuts represent a return to replacement rates equal to or
below 1930s levels (Korpi 2003). Between 1994-2001, the UK invested only .4% of
GDP on state-sponsored childcare, benefiting only 6% of eligible children (Gash 2008).
In addition private childcare was "prohibitively expensive for low [wage] earners" (Gash
2008: 660). Child benefits were cut to a 30-year low (Kus 2006). At 120 weeks, the UK
has one of the largest gaps between the end of maternity leave and school age (Warren et
al. 2010). Additionally, pension indexes were lowered and the pension age for women
rose from 60 to 65 (Starke 2008). For men, parental leave time was extended but taken
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unpaid (Warren et al. 2010).
With the election of Tony Blair in 1997, ideologies shifted. While remaining
economically austere, the Labour party was able to reinstate and strengthen some genderegalitarian policies. These included extending paid maternity leave to 26 weeks,
reducing pre-leave restrictions, expanding job reinstatement rights, extending mandatory
maternity pay benefits, and increasing childcare subsidies (Gangl and Ziefle 2009). In
addition, the "New Labour" movement that took hold with Blair's election sought to
protect labor market flexibility in the name of profit while compensating for "the
inequalities and failures of deregulated labor markets" (Clasen and Clegg 2004:92). A
minimum wage was established and additional subsidies and tax credits were
implemented for those in low wage jobs. The UK appears to have experienced one of the
most significant welfare state retrenchments including universal reductions in social
benefits and thus placed the highest level of risk on households.
Fertility Trends
The fertility trend in the United Kingdom is the least conforming to my above
stated hypotheses. The UK has radically redefined the role of the state in the market as
well as reducing social insurance placing large amounts of risk on individuals and
households, especially women. Yet, it never reaches lowest-low fertility nor are there any
dramatic declines correlated with changes in market relationships or welfare state
retrenchment. While H4 would predict an accelerated downward trend and only modest,
if any, upward trend toward replacement levels, the UK reflects a very even total fertility
rate. See Figure 7. It has modest fluctuation that may simply reflect temporary changes
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in political leadership, ecological circumstances, or natural rhythm fluctuations. Further
analysis in both the UK as well as additional application of this theory are necessary to
understand if there are other spurious variables to take into consideration or if there is
something unique about the UK.
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CHAPTER V
SO WHAT? DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Findings
The case studies presented above provide a compelling argument. Each country
represents a geographically and culturally similar advanced Western democracy. Yet each
country has its own distinct fertility patten as seen in Figure 8. Each entered into the
global market at approximately the same time but the policy decisions implemented
appear to be quite distinct in each country.
Sweden and France both moved towards a low degree of neoliberalism and
protected their gender-egalitarian policies that allow women to work and care for
children. Both states remained highly involved in the public and private sectors without
allowing political leadership changes to dramatically shift labor market relations or
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household risk. The speed at which each country adapted to the neoliberal ethos was
modestly different. Sweden appears to have taken a slower pace-both in entry and policy
adaptation. The exception would be the period between 1996-1999 in which changes
occurred rapidly but were also reversed equally as fast. This "fertility dip" is quite
noticeable and seems to correlate with these policy decisions. In the case of France, it is
difficult to explain how a country can quickly adapt to a low level of change. However,
market liberalization and decentralization began to occur in the early 1980s and remain to
this day. Changes in regulatory bodies and procedures and labor contracts occurred
rapidly but were still heavily monitored and influenced by statist protection. Against the
backdrop of these changes, the state also remained committed to protect individuals as
well as families from market risks and insecurities. The end results are TFRs in both
countries on an upward swing and current levels at 1.8 in Sweden and 1.89 in France.
Germany and the UK both implemented extremely austere measures and used the
realm of social insurance to find savings and cut costs. Both made sweeping changes that
affected most state-market-employee relationships as well as individual social insurance
programs. Germany moved at a more gradual pace up until re-unification when
population size, existing structures, and rising demand forced radical and quick decisions.
The UK was equally austere but at a much quicker pace. Sweeping changes began with
Thatcher's election in 1979 and dramatic changes occurred until 1983. She remained
highly successful in the realm of market liberalization and decentralization and
moderately successful in welfare state retrenchment. By the start of her unprecedented
third term in 1987, she began to try to dismantle national healthcare but failed under
popular dissent (Prasad 2006). The final outcome in these countries is complicated.
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Current TFR trends in Germany remain extremely stagnate with the 2005-2010 estimate
predicting a TFR of 1.36. This is a negligible improvement over the lowest low TFR of
1.31 during the reunification process. The UK, however, appears to have the most stable
TFR of all four case studies over the 35 year time frame in question. Like Sweden and
France, the UK appears to be on a strong upward trend and has the second highest current
TFR at 1.82. It remains unclear why the neoliberal mechanisms outlined above do not
seem to have the same downward pressure on fertility nor do speed and degree of
adaptation appear to interrupt fertility trends as found in the other three case studies. The
unique role of ideological motivations may play a crucial role in determining what sets
the UK apart from the other case studies. The United States is also typically described as
highly ideological in its decision making and could be used as a counter study to see if
the UK and the US share similar deviations from my theoretical model and, if so, how to
account for those in future studies. Table 1 provides a summary of neoliberal policy
decisions that impacted both labor market and household risk. I combine this empirical
evidence with the theoretical impact of speed and degree of adaptation using each of the
four historical case studies. Table 2 then provides a summary of the policy decisions
made by each country to mitigate the impact of the above policy decisions. I also suggest
to what degree each country was capable of doing so.
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Table 1. Neoliberal Adaptation by Mechanism and Country
Degree

Table 2. Policies For Mitigating Social Risk By Country
Low

Sweden
France

Fast

Speed

- Privatization of state
businesses
- Elimination of state-run system
of wage bargaining
- Decreased state funding
- Decline in public employment
- Use of FTC

- Reductions in sick pay,
unemployment benefits,
pensions indexes, parental
leaves, and child allowances

Increased Labor Market Risk

Increased Household Risk

- Privatization of state-owned
businesses
- Increased unemployment
- Use of FTC
- Increased use of part-time and
temporary positions

- Reduction of window of
eligibility for social benefits
- Decrease in unemployment
wage and sick pay replacement
levels
- Reduction in maternity leave
- Inadequate childcare facilities

- Privatization of state
businesses
- Private regulatory agencies
- Abolition of job dismissal
legislation
- Increased unemployment
- Increased use of part-time and
temporary positions
- Increased use of FTC

- Notably wage penalty on
mothers
- Reductions in sick pay,
unemployment wages, pensions
indexes, accident
compensation, maternity leave,
and child allowances
- Financial barriers to childcare

Table 2. Policies for Mitigating Social Risk by Country
Individual Risk

Household Risk

Overall Mitigation of
Social Risk

Sweden

- Active Labor Market
Policies (ALMP)

- Increases in: parental
leave, public daycare,
paid sick leave, and
paid vacation time
- Restoration of cuts

MEDIUM

Germany

- Strong collective
bargaining institutions

- Increases in long-term
care insurance

LOW

France

United Kingdom

- Statist intervention of - Maximum 35-hour
national sell-offs
work week
- Use of state-interested - Creation of a job
Independent Regulatory bonus
Agencies (IRA)
- Community-funded
- ALMP
childcare centers

- Establishment of a
minimum wage and
wage subsidy

- Reinstatement of
gender-egalitarian
policies including:
increasing paid
maternity leave,
reducing pre-leave
restrictions, expanding
job reinstatement rights,
extending mandatory
maternity pay benefits,
and increasing childcare
subsidies

HIGH

MEDIUM

United Kingdom

- Increased unemployment
- Use of Fixed Term Contracts
(FTC)

Increased Household Risk

Germany

Slow

Increased Labor Market Risk

High
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Limitations
When trying to address micro level decisions from a macro perspective, there are
sure to be limitations. With this project, I simply seek to add theoretical insight into the
conversation of decreasing global fertility. Additional application of this framework to
other unique geographical, cultural, political, and economical situations would be
necessary to re-evaluate my theoretical and methodological frameworks. The use of ideal
models may discourage some readers, but which additional case studies may help lend
credibility. For the purpose of this study, the empirical case studies have validated my
theoretical model and highlighted the importance of desegregating labor market and
welfare state retrenchment literature. As demonstrated by the United Kingdom, this
model is far from perfect. I intend for my future projects to discover if the UK is
inherently unique or if there are additional mechanisms that may need to be added to my
model. Additional cases studies are also necessary to utilize the ideal types model in
creating a more generalizable theory of how neoliberal economic policies have impacted
fertility on global scale.
Future Implications
While the impact of these state and social policy changes on women in emerging
economies and developing nations requires similar analysis, I contend that it is out of the
scope of this paper and remains a topic of viable interest for future research.
Additionally, this new theoretical approach to fertility decline based on the downward
pressure of labor market risk and household risk on women and their families should be

53
tested in less traditional and less ideal countries including the Eastern Block post-1989,
the Asian Miracle markets, and the politically polarized, ideologically driven United
States. One other area of interest may be the impact of forced neoliberalism through
structural adjustment as imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank.
As all good theories should, I seek to provide a theoretical framework that can be
practically applied in real life situations. As the research examining below replacement
fertility and the influence of macro structures continues, policy implications may start to
be derived. Researchers or advocates concerned with pronatalist policy implications
would want to further understand in what ways policies have the potential to impact
fertility. Primary areas of interest include fertility promotion, fertility reduction, and the
impact on age structure and dependency ratios. European pronatalist policy attempts
have been considered modestly successful at best. I contend that the existing policies are
too one sided-they either aid in providing social insurance to families or increase
women's ability to work. Policies that want to effectively promote higher fertility rates
should seek to address both labor market and household risks.
Another area that may seek to build on this research includes migration studies
and the role that immigrants play in boosting TFRs and positive population growth.
While politically unpopular, acknowledgement of below replacement fertility levels and
the impact on population structure and economic stability may provide a useful migration
advocation argument (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006).
Finally, there are consequences that will continue to stem from globalization as
states seek to remain internationally competitive while protecting national interests.
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"When one peels back the outer layers of rhetoric and sorts through the different
measures to advance privatization, targeting, employment, and individual responsibility,
we arrive at a common core of market-oriented social policies that . . . represent the
triumph of capitalism" (Gilbert 2002:182). Corporations may need to re-evaluate
business practices or be held accountable by governmental legislation before the working
age labor force shrinks beyond their control.
Conclusion
The combination of Polanyi's conception of socially embedded markets and
Breen's analysis of hedging risk in society have provided a useful framework for
examining the impact of neoliberal policy adaptation on fertility decisions. My
integration of their ideas has successfully led to the identification of labor market risk and
household risk as empirical mechanisms that appear to exert downward pressure on
fertility. Using case studies to test my ideal examples of adaptation based on speed and
degree have helped to support my hypotheses while also providing a path for continued
research in this field. While other elements of downward pressure on fertility may still
remain undiscovered, this paper is persuasive in suggesting that both state-marketemployee labor relationships and social insurance programs are both influential over
fertility decisions. This paper has also provided a compelling argument that a negative
relationship between labor market and household risk and fertility trends may exist.
When it comes to individual, micro level decision-making processes, complete
understanding of those processes is unrealistic, but in the case of women's fertility
decisions, previous research indicates that the neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s
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have influenced the way in which women consider the risk of childbearing. Changing
industries, declining wages, privatization, deregulation, increasing globalization, and
decreased social insurance tip the scale of risk and recommodify women's labor in the
market. Society will have to re-evaluate their priorities as a population before the market
shapes women's decisions on its own. The burden of running the home and the economy
may grow too large for women to bear alone. Without the aid of governmental social
insurance and an accommodating labor market, fertility levels may continue current
trends of negative population growth as women maintain or even increase current levels
of labor force participation and thus may choose to forgo childbearing. It would appear
that fertility is no longer determined by the love of a child, but for the money needed to
survive in a neoliberal economy.
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